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Newfoundland’s Continental Shelf: 
The Jurisdictional Issue
H. WADE MacLAUCHLAN*
The matter of jurisdiction over the minerals of Newfoundland's 
continental shelf area raises an intriguing combination of 
constitutional and international law issues. Newfoundland’s unique 
historical position gives rise to some novel legal questions, the 
responses to which demand precise formulation of concepts which have 
not heretofore been definitively articulated.
An examination of decisions in Canada, Australia and the 
United States reveals that what is ostensibly a highly technical legal 
issue may be resolved on the basis of political considerations. While the 
conclusion that the matter is inherently political is inevitable, the legal 
issues are nevertheless challenging and worthy of exposition.
Une multitude de points de droit constitutionnel et international 
découlent de la question relative à la compétence au sujet des 
minéraux du plateau continental au large de Terre-Neuve. De plus, 
la situation historique particulière de Terre-Neuve conduit à la 
création de nouveaux problèmes juridiques. Et ceux-ci exigent la 
formulation précise de concepts qui, jusqu’à présent, n'ont pas eu à 
être définis explicitement.
Tout ceci nous mène à une étude des décisions au Canada, en 
Australie et aux Etats-Unis. Etude qui d'ailleurs nous fa it découvrir 
que ce qui, à première vue, semble être une question hautement 
juridique et technique, peut en somme se résoudre à partir de 
considérations politiques. Et bien qu'il s'avère que le problème soit 
essentiellement politique, les divers aspects juridiques qui s’en dégagent 
sont du plus grand intérêt et méritent qu’on s’y attarde . . .
INTRODUCTION
T h e  potential m ineral wealth o f  the continental shelf o ff 
N ew foundland may rival that o f B ritain’s N orth Sea. Official estimates 
o f  the extent o f  petroleum  resources in the H ibernia area o f the G rand 
Banks predict it is capable o f  producing ten billion barrels o f  oil and at 
least 15 trillion cubic feet o f  natural gas.1 This is a resource which, even
•B.B.A., 1976 (U.P.E.I.), LL.B. candidate. Fatuity o f Law, University o f New Brunswick.
“‘Dispute Over Offshore Jurisdiction Will Affect Hibernia Development", Evening Telegram (St. John’s), 
28 Aug. 1980, per R H. Carlyle, Senior Vice-President of Gulf Oil Resources.
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at cu rren t world prices, promises enorm ous revenues to the governm ent 
which exercises jurisdiction over the area. In addition to the revenue 
potential, the governm ent which exercises jurisdiction will be able to 
control the rate and m anner o f exploitation to coincide with its social, 
environm ental and economic policies. Evidently then, this issue is one o f  
the most consequential legal questions to ever arise in Canada.
In addition to being o f  great consequence, the issue is complex, 
raising an uncom m on com bination o f  constitutional and international 
questions o f law. In respect o f  the latter, an adjudication would have to 
determ ine w hether o r not the concept o f  coastal state jurisdiction over 
the resources o f the continental shelf could be said to be custom ary at 
international law prior to N ew foundland’s entry into C onfederation on 
March 31, 1949. If that was found to be the case, the next issue to be 
resolved would be w hether o r not N ew foundland had the requisite 
degree o f external sovereignty to succeed to such jurisdiction even if it 
was a custom ary principle o f  international law. On the o th er hand, if 
such jurisdiction became a reality after C onfederation, there would have 
to be a determ ination as to which level o f  governm ent in the Canadian 
federation is entitled to exercise it.
T h e  intriguing aspect o f  this problem  is that because o f 
N ew foundland’s unique historical position, an adjudication would have 
to articulate some theoretical concepts which have thus far been 
shrouded in ambiguity. A determ ination would require an analysis o f 
the relationship between Great Britain and its Dominions, in particular 
N ew foundland, to decide at what, if any, point in time the Dominion 
could be said to be sovereign. Similarly, in the area o f international law, 
the analysis o f  the crystallization o f custom ary principles o f law has been 
largely academic and theoretical. In this case a court would be faced 
with a precise time period and specific indicia upon which to base its 
conclusion. T h e  articulation o f  “threshold" tests for these concepts 
presents a form idable challenge to an eventual judicial resolution.
THE OFFSHORE LEGAL REGIME
T he extent o f  coastal state jurisdiction in offshore areas2 was first 
standardized by the Geneva C onference on the Law o f the Sea which 
adjourned April 28, 1958. Tw o o f  the four conventions which em erged 
from  that conference are o f  particular interest respecting jurisdiction 
over offshore m inerals; the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone,3 and the Convention on the Continental Shelf.4 T h e  form er
’In this part, the legal regimes of both the continental shelf and the territorial sea will be discussed as a 
familiarity with the latter is necessary to appreciate the former. Where the jurisdictional issue is 
concerned the two regimes raise distinct and complex legal issues, particularly in historical terms, and 
the disc ussion here will be restricted to the jurisdictional question respecting the continental shelf.
*U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.52. For text see: (1958) 52 \m er. J. Intl. Law 834.
4U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.55. For text see: (1958)52 \m tr . J. Intl. Law 858.
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states simply that the sovereignty o f a state extends to the territorial sea, 
to its superjacent airspace, and to the seabed and subsoil.5 T he  breadth  
o f the territorial sea is not defined in the Convention but the com bined 
territorial sea and contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles 
from  the baselines.6 T h e  natu re o f  the jurisdiction over the resources o f 
the adjacent seabed is implicit in the word “sovereignty”; w hether it can 
be understood to m ean “ow nership” is open to some debate.7 At the 
very least it means the right to explore, exploit and dispose o f  the 
m inerals of the territorial seabed.
As for the continental shelf, the coastal state exercises sovereign 
rights for the purpose o f  exploring it and exploiting its natural 
resources.8 T h e  1958 Convention defined the shelf as the seabed “outside 
the area o f the territorial sea, to a depth  o f 200 m etres or, beyond that 
limit, to where the dep th  o f  the superjacent waters admits o f  the 
exploitation o f the natural resources o f the said waters”.9
Since 1973, m ultilateral negotiations have been taking place to 
create a new law o f the sea and are expected to conclude in a new treaty 
to be adopted at Caracas in 1981.10 T h e  provisions respecting offshore 
m ineral jurisdiction are not expected to be altered from  those in the 
present Informal Text.11 T h e  provisions for the territorial sea have not 
been significantly altered since the 1958 Convention, the breadth  still 
being limited to 12 nautical m iles.12 T h e  rights o f  the coastal state over 
the continental shelf also rem ain the same, viz. sovereign rights for the 
purpose o f exploring and exploiting its natural resources.13 T h e  
outw ard extent o f  the shelf is m ore strictly defined than in the 1958 
Convention, being at least 200 nautical miles and w here the continental 
m argin extends beyond that, to the ou ter edge o f the m argin .14
^Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, art. 1.
*lbid., art. 24. In Canada the outer limit o f our territorial sea was established at three nautical miles 
from the baselines in the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, S.C. 1964-65, c. 22. In 1970, this was 
extended to twelve miles by An Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, S.C. 1969-70, c. 68.
TSee Harrison, Rowland J., “Jurisdiction Over the Canadian Offshore: A Sea of Confusion", (1979) 17 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 469, at 480-86.
*Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 2.
*Ibid., art 1.
‘““Canada Makes Gains on Offshore Control”, Evening Telegram (St. John ’s), 5 Sept. 1980, p. 1. per Alan 
Beesley, Chief Canadian Negotiator at Law of the Sea Conference.
“ Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 3, U.N. D<x. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Rev. 3, 27 August 
1980.
xt!bid., art. 3. 
l3lbid., art. 77.
t4Ibid., art. 96. In cases where the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles, there are formulae 
established by which the coastal state can fix the outer limit.
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An interesting innovation o f the new regim e which has implications 
for the N ew foundland developm ent is a provision for contributions to 
an international fund to he m ade from  the proceeds o f exploitation o f 
non-living resources at points beyond 200 nautical m iles.15 T he  
contribution may rise to seven per cen t16 o f  the value o r volume o f 
production and is designed to provide for the needs o f  developing 
landlocked states. Subject to this qualification, the coastal state has 
exclusive sovereign rights over the natural resources o f the continental 
shelf.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE CONTINENTAL 
SHELF
Jurisdiction o f  the littoral state over the resources o f  the adjacent 
continental shelf is a relatively new concept in international law. A 
creature o f technological and scientific advancem ent, it was unknown to 
international lawyers as recently as forty years ago. In addressing the 
historical developm ent o f  the doctrine o f  the continental shelf, particular 
attention will be paid to the period prio r to March 31, 1949 when the 
Dominion o f  N ew foundland en tered  into C onfederation .17 Prior to this 
date, neither N ew foundland n o r C anada had issued any express 
declaration o f  jurisdiction  over the shelf area. T hus, the issue with 
respect to the em ergence o f the doctrine o f the Continental Shelf is 
w hether it had crystallized as a custom ary principle o f international law 
prio r to the above “critical date”. If the concept had achieved such status 
by that date, the jurisdiction would accrue to the littoral state 
automatically by virtue o f its sovereign status18 as a nation.
T h e  earliest instrum ent pu rpo rting  to lay a sovereign claim to 
subm arine resources appears to be a 1942 bilateral treaty between Great 
Britain and Venezuela respecting certain m arine areas in the G ulf o f 
Paria.19 While the instrum ent does not re fe r to the continental shelf by 
that nam e, it acknowledges certain rights in the G ulf between the Island 
o f  T rin idad  and the coast o f  Venezuela.
T h e  first express assertion o f  a sovereign claim to the shelf was 
m ade by the U nited States on Septem ber 28, 1945, when the U.S.
l5T he continental margin off Newfoundland extends to approximately 400 miles from the toast in the 
Flemish Cap area. T he Hibernia site is within the 200 mile limit.
14Informal Composite Negotiating Text, Art. 82. No contribution is made w ith respect to production for the 
first five years. In the sixth year, one per cent is payable and the rate shall increase by one per cent for 
each subsequent year until the twelfth year and shall remain at seven per cent thereafter.
British North America Act. 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. VI. c. 22 (U.K.).
'"The issue o f whether or not Newfoundland had sufficient sovereign status to succeed to such rights at 
international law, if they did exist, will be discussed at pp. 90-99, infra.
'»Treaty Series, No. 10 (1942). C.mnd. 6400.
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asserted; . . the continental shelf may be regarded  as an extension o f 
the land-mass o f  the coastal nation and thus naturally ap p u rten an t to 
it. . .”20 F urtherm ore the claim, popularly known as the T rum an  
Proclam ation, asserted that the U nited States regards the natural 
resources o f  the shelf as “appertain ing  to the U nited States, subject to its 
jurisdiction and control.”21 T his proclam ation was followed by similar 
claims by a num ber o f  o th er states, mainly Latin-American. T h e  states 
which had m ade such express declarations by 1949 were: Mexico 
(1945),22 A rgentina (1946),23 Chile (1947),24 Peru (1947),25 Costa Rica 
(1948), N icaragua (1948), G uatem ala (1948), Panam a (1946), Bahamas 
(1948), and Jam aica (1948).26 Some o f these claims closely followed the 
m odel o f  the T ru m an  Proclam ation while others went so far as to claim 
the superjacent waters and the m arine resources therein. C om m on to all 
was an assertion o f jurisdiction over the seabed resources o f the 
continental shelf.
It is not immediately clear w hether o r not the concept o f  coastal 
state jurisdiction had em erged as a custom ary principle o f international 
law by 1949. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, writing in 1950, asserted that the 
right o f appropriation  had become “part o f international law by custom 
initiated by the leading m aritim e powers and acquiesced in by the 
generality o f  states.”27 H e was obviously im pressed by the fact that two 
o f  the m ajor m aritim e powers, G reat Britain and the U nited States, had 
been early participants in the jurisdictional claims. Britain, while not 
having m ade an express claim to h er own shelf area, had m ade claims 
on behalf o f  the Bahamas, Jam aica, and (by 1950) a num ber o f  
Sheikdom s and Protectorates in the M iddle East.28 L auterpacht argued 
that these two m ajor m aritim e powers, traditional adherents o f  the 
concept o f “freedom  o f  the seas”, had adopted the practice; Josef L. 
Kunz, however, used the same analysis to argue that no such custom had 
crystallized. He pointed ou t that “[ajbout fifteen states have applied it;
10Proclamation By the Prrstdmt with Respect to the Natural Resources o f the Subsoil and Sea Bed o f the 
Continental Shelf, September 28, 1945, (1946) 40 Amer. J. Intl. Law Suppl. 45-46.
t 'lbid., at 46.
’’See generally: Young, Richard, “T he Legal Status o f Submarine Areas Beneath the High Seas”, (1951) 
45 Amer. J. Intl. Law  225; Mouton, M. W., “T he Continental Shelf’, (1954) 85 Rec. des Cours 347.
t3Declaratum Proclaiming Sovereignty Over the Epicontinental Sea and the Continental Shelf October 9, 1946,
(1947) 41 Amer. J. Intl. Law Suppl. 11.
i *Declaratwn by the President o f the Republic o f Chile, Regarding Chilean Territorial Claims, June 1947, (1948) 
2 Intl. Law Quart. 135.
^Peruvian Decree Regarding National Sovereignty and Jurisdiction Over the Continental and Insular Shelf,
(1948) 2 Intl. Law Quart. 137.
’•The Bahamian and Jamaican claims were asserted by British O rders in Council, Statutory 
instrum ents, 1948, Nos. 2514, 2574.
’ ’Lauterpacht, H., "Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas”, (1950) 27 Brit. K_fl. Intl. Law 376, at 431.
"Ibid., at 381.
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but many im portant states, such as the U nited Kingdom, as far as the 
m o ther country is concerned, France, Italy, Spain, West Germ any, the 
Scandanavian states, Japan , the Soviet U nion, have not done so.”29
M. W. M outon, afte r reviewing the diverse claims o f  states up  to 
1954, concluded: . . the Declarations are not declaratory o f  existing 
law no r do the Decrees express a ru le o f  existing law. H ere again the 
contrary has been asserted in the Declarations as well as by authors, 
w ithout any vestige o f  p ro o f however.”30
Lord Asquith o f  Bishopstone, in a 1952 arbitral decision, reviewed 
the relevant materials and concluded:
I am o f  the opinion that there are in this field so many ragged ends and 
unfilled blanks, so much that is merely tentative and exploratory, that in no 
form can the doctrine claim as yet to have assumed hitherto the hard 
lineaments or the definitive status o f  an established rule o f  international law.31
In 1951, the In ternational Law Commission directed itself to 
consolidating and articulating a legal regim e for the continental shelf. 
This work culm inated in 1958 in the Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf. 32 T h e  first th ree  articles o f  this Convention, which outline the 
basic concept o f  littoral state jurisdiction over the resource o f  the shelf, 
were deliberated in 1969 by the In ternational C ourt o f  Justice when it 
was confronted with a d ispute between Denm ark, West Germ any, and 
the N etherlands.33 T h e  noncom m ittal m anner in which the In ternational 
C ourt o f  Justice described the status o f the continental shelf regim e in 
its ju d g m en t is an excellent illustration o f the ambiguity o f the problem . 
A ddressing the issue o f  the custom ary natu re o f  the jurisdiction, the 
court stated; “[t]hese th ree articles . . . were then regarded as reflecting, 
o r as crystallizing, received o r at least em ergent rules o f  custom ary 
international law relative to the continental shelf.”34 If the court was so 
inscrutable in its analysis o f  the regim e as o f  1958, o u r ability to analyze 
its precise status as o f  M arch 31, 1949, is even m ore dubious. It is clear 
from  the evidence that sometime prio r to 1958 the doctrine o f coastal 
state sovereignty over the resources o f the continental shelf em erged o r 
crystallized as a custom ary rule o f  international law. W hat is not clear, 
and yet is crucial to a determ ination  o f  the N ew foundland issue, is 
w hether such a principle could be said to have crystallized p rio r to
’•Kunz, Josef L., “Continental Shelf and International Law: Confusion and Abuse", (1950) 50 Amer. J.
Intl. Law 828. at 830, n. 16.
30M. W. Mouton, supra, footnote 22, at 425.
3lAbu Dhabi Arbitratwn (1952), 1 Intl. Comp. Law Quart. 247, at 256.
32Supra, footnote 4.
33North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] Intl. Ct. Just. 3.
3*lbid„ at 39.
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M arch 31, 1949. Given the divergence o f  opinion, one has to question 
the validity o f deciding so consequential an issue on such an am biguous 
point o f law.
It has been argued35 that it is possible to avert such an analysis by 
adopting a statem ent from  the decision in the Continental Shelf cases 
which characterizes the jurisdiction as an inherent right o f  states which 
exists ipso facto  and ab initio. T h e  court stated that it entertained  “no 
d o u b t” that:
. . . the rights o f  the coastal state in respect o f  the area o f  continental shelf 
that constitutes a natural prolongation o f  its land territory into and under the 
sea exist ipso facto  and ab initio, by virtue o f  its sovereignty over the land, and 
as an extension o f  it in an exercise o f  sovereign rights for the purpose o f  
exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources. In short, there is 
here an inherent right. . . .  Its existence can be declared (and many states 
have done this) but does not need to be constituted.36
Such a view, it is said, is consistent with the proclam ations o f the various 
states asserting their rights; they p u rp o rt to be declaratory, not 
constitutive. If this view is correct, it would dispense with the necessity o f 
analyzing the historical em ergence o f the doctrine. T h e  difficulty with 
this point o f view is that it appears to ignore the basic concept o f m aking 
international law by custom: no rights exist ab initio. For a principle to 
become custom ary international law it m ust first have become an 
established practice and secondly must be acknowledged by opinio juris.37 
O ne o f the most succinct statem ents o f these prerequisites is found in 
the decision o f the International C ourt o f Justice in the Continental Shelf 
cases:
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they 
must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence o f  a 
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence o f  a rule o f  law 
requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence o f  a subjective 
element, is implicit in the very notion o f the opinio juris sive necessitatis. 38
Until these two factors are evidenced, no custom is said to exist. T hus it 
is a contradiction in terms to say that a custom ary principle o f 
international law exists ab initio if, by that, we mean it has always existed.
I he Australian states advanced the ab initio argum ent before the 
High C ourt o f  Australia in New South Wales and Others v. Commonwealth; 
Gibbs J. responded as follows:
” Martin, Cabot, “Newfoundland’s Case on Offshore Minerals: A Brief Outline”, (1975) 7 Ottawa Law
Rev. 34, at 39. Also New South Wales and Others v. Commonwealth (1975), 8 Aust. Law Rep. 1, at 49; 50 
Aust. Law J. Rep. 218, at 243 (Aust. H.C.). Hereinafter all citations will be to Aust. Law Rep.
3*North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra, footnote 33, at 22.
,7See: Kipelmanas, Lazare, "Custom as a Means of the Creation o f International Law”, (1937) 18 bnt. 
YJ). Intl. Law 127.
3Worth Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra, footnote 33, at 44.
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T o say the rights o f  coastal States in respect o f  the continental shelf 
existed from the beginning o f time may or may not be correct as a matter o f  
legal theory. In fact, however, the rights now recognized represent the 
response o f  international law to m odem  developm ents o f  science and 
technology. . . . Those rights, if theoretically inherent in the sovereignty o f  
coastal States, were in fact the result o f  the operation o f  a new legal 
principle.38
T h e  response o f Gibbs J . to the argum ent is that, while it may be 
theoretically correct to  speak o f  a right being “inheren t” once it has 
become custom ary, all custom ary rights m ust have a genesis at some 
point. T h at the International C ourt also recognizes the need for such a 
genesis before a right can be said to exist ab initio is apparen t at 
paragraph  47 o f its ju d g m en t w here it reviews the origins and 
developm ent o f coastal state jurisdictions:
A review o f  the genesis and developm ent o f  the equidistance method o f  
delimitation can only serve to confirm the foregoing conclusion. Such a 
review may appropriately start with the instrument, generally known as the 
“Truman Proclamation”, issued by the (iovernm ent o f  the United States on 
28 September 1945. Although this instrument was not the first or only one to 
have appeared, it has in the opinion o f  the Court a special status. Previously, 
various theories as to the nature and extent o f  the rights relative to or 
exercisable over the continental shelf had been advanced by jurists, publicists 
and technicians. T he Truman Proclamation however, s<x:>n came to be 
regarded as the starting point o f  the positive law on the subject.40
In this passage it is evident that the court only recognizes “inheren t” 
rights once they can be said to be custom ary principles o f  law. For 
example, while it is correct to say that the Federal Republic o f Germ any 
had an “inheren t” right to jurisdiction over the continental shelf in 1969, 
it does not follow that such rights have always been inherent. It is not 
possible then, and this is clear in the ju d g m en t in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, to avoid an historical analysis to determ ine 
w hether the necessary state practice and opinio juris have been evidenced 
to constitute a custom ary principle o f law.
T h e  issue, therefore, remains at what precise point in time did the 
concept acquire the status o f  a custom ary principle o f  international law; 
was it o r was it not custom ary as o f M arch 31, 1949? In light o f  the 
exacting standards required  to establish such a “crystallization”, the 
view o f  this au tho r is that the balance o f  opinion is not in N ew foundland’s 
favour.
NEWFOUNDLAND’S HISTORICAL POSITION
N ew foundland’s unique status immediately prior to entering 
C onfederation raises the question o f w hether o r not it had the requisite 
degree o f  sovereignty to succeed to jurisdiction over the continental
3tNrw South Walts v. C.ommonwralth, supra, footnote 35, at 49. 
*°Supra, footnote 33, at 34-5.
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shelf even if such jurisdiction can be said to have been custom ary at 
international law by that time.
From 1934 to C onfederation, N ew foundland was governed by a 
Commission o f G overnm ent du rin g  which period its pre-1934 
constitution was suspended. In o rd e r to determ ine w hether o r not 
N ew foundland, at any time p rio r to C onfederation  was sufficiently 
sovereign to claim jurisdictional rights, a court would have to deal with 
the concept o f  state sovereignty in m ore precise term s than we have yet 
seen. An adjudication would involve a form ulation o f the threshold 
point at which a state achieves full sovereignty and would also require an 
analysis o f  the Im perial relationship between Britain and N ew foundland.
For purposes o f analyzing N ew foundland’s sovereign status it is 
appropria te  to deal with its history in th ree stages: the period prior to 
February 16, 1934; the period o f Commission o f  G overnm ent, 1934-49; 
and the precise m om ent prior to C onfederation on M arch 31, 1949.
Pre-1934
T h e  period leading up  to the Statute of Westminster41 o f 1931 is one 
m arked by em erging sovereign status for the m em bers o f  the British 
Com m onwealth. Com m entators have been reluctant to designate any 
exact point in time at which the Dominions became full-fledged 
m em bers o f the international com m unity.42 T h e  Suprem e C ourt o f 
C anada has concluded that C anadian sovereignty was acquired in the 
period between the Treaty of Versailles, 1919 and the Statute o f Westminster 
in 1931. T h e  reluctance o f  the Suprem e C ourt to be m ore precise on the 
occasion o f the B.C. Offshore Reference43 is indicative o f  the ambiguity o f 
such analysis.
T h e  status o f Newfoundland du rin g  the period when Canada 
acquired its sovereignty is even m ore difficult to determ ine. 
N ew foundland was not a m em ber o f  the League o f  Nations and in dis­
cussions as to the right o f Dominion Parliam ents to legislate extra- 
territorially, which flowed from  the Im perial C onference o f 1926, 
had m ade it clear that it did not seek the same privileges as o ther 
Dominion Governm ents.44 At its own request, N ew foundland, along with 
Australia and New Zealand, was exem pted from  the application o f key 
provisions o f  the Statute of Westminster. 45 Am ong the provisions which
*'Statute o f Westminster, 22 Geo. V, c. 4 (U.K.).
“ See Wheare, K. C., The Statute o f Westminster and Domimon Status (5th ed. 1953).
43Reference: Re Ownership o f Offshore Mineral Rights. [1967] S.C.R 792, at 816; 65 D.L.R. (2d) 353, at 375.
“ Chadwick, St. J., Newfoundland, Island Into Province (1967), at 172.
4SSupra, footnote 41, art. 10.
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New foundland declined to have applied to it was a suspension4“ o f the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act;*1 full pow er to m ake laws having 
extra-territorial operation ;48 and the extinguishm ent o f  the power o f the 
Im perial Parliam ent to make law's extending to N ew foundland, except 
w here New foundland consented.49 T hose provisions o f  the Statute of 
Westminster which applied to N ew foundland, New Zealand and Australia 
simply enum erated  them  as being am ong the “Dom inions”50 and relieved 
them  o f the appellation “Colony”.51 T h e  exem ption o f these th ree  
Dominions, by their own choice, from  the provisions o f  the Statute of 
Westminster may not be conclusive on the issue o f their sovereign status. 
W hereas N ew foundland was exem pted from  article 4, respecting the 
application o f Im perial laws, it was clearly included in the pream ble 
which states inter alia: “[a]nd w hereas it is in accord with the established 
constitutional position that no law h ereafer m ade by the Parliam ent o f  
the U nited Kingdom shall extend to any o f the said Dominions as part 
o f  the law o f that Dominion otherw ise than at the request and with the 
consent o f  that Dom inion.” This statem ent o f the “established 
constitutional position” would appear to counter any implication to be 
draw n from  the fact that N ew foundland, New Zealand and Australia 
were exem pted from  the operation o f  articles 2 and 4. As for article 3, 
the power to make laws having extra-territorial operation, there is some 
debate as to w hether the Statute of Westminster was constitutive in that 
regard , the most convincing contrary indication being the ju d g m en t o f  
the Privy Council in Croft v. Dunphy, 52 w here C anadian “hovering” 
legislation to enforce customs laws was upheld in spite o f  the fact that 
the conviction in question pre-dated the Statute of Westminster. It is 
arg u ed 53 that the Statute was declaratory as opposed to being constitutive
**lbid., art. 2.
4728 & 29 Viet., c. 63 (U.K.).
48Statute o f Westminster, supra, fcxrtnote 41, art. 3.
**Ibid., art. 4. 
solbid., art. I.
i i Ibid., art. 11.
M[I933] A.C. 156, at 163, per Lord MacMillan.
But while the Imperial Parliament may be conceded to possess such powers of legislation 
under international law and usage, the respondent contends that the Parliament o f Canada has 
no such powers. It is not contested that under the British North America Act the Dominion 
legislature has full power to enact customs laws for Canada, but it is maintained that it is 
debarred from introducing into such legislation any provisions designed to operate beyond its 
shores or at any rate beyond a marine league from the coast.
In their Lordship’s opinion the Parliament o f Canada is not under any such disability. Once 
it is found that a particular topic o f legislation is among those upon which the Dominion 
Parliament may competently legislate as being for the peace, order and good government of 
Canada or as being one o f the specific subjects enum erated in s. 91 of the British North 
Americ a Act, their lordships see no reason to restric t the permitted scope o f  such legislation by 
any other consideration than is applicable to the legislation of a fully Sovereign State.
“ Martin, Cabot, supra, footnote 35, at 39.
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o f sovereign status. This is impliedly the view o f the Suprem e C ourt o f 
C anada in the B.C. Offshore Minerals Reference w here it is stated that 
C anada achieved its sovereign status between the Treaty of Versailles and 
the Statute of Westminster.54 T h ere  are some dicta supportive o f this view 
in a judgm ent o f  Latham  C.J. in the High C ourt o f Australia:
It is perhaps also not out o f  place to mention that the preamble o f  the 
Statute o f Westminster 1931 (22 Geo. V. c. 4) refers to a certain constitutional 
position as "established." namely, the facts that the Crown is the symbol o f  the 
free association o f  the members o f  the British Commonwealth o f  Nations, that 
they are united by common allegiance to the Crown and that laws thereafter 
made by the Parliament o f  the United Kingdom should not extend to any 
part o f  the Dominions as part o f  the law o f  that Dominion otherwise than at 
the request and with the consent o f  that Dominion. This “established 
position” is recognized rather than created by the Statute of Westminster.™
T h e  language o f  the Balfour Declaration o f 1926 would appear to 
support the view that some degree o f sovereignty had already been 
achieved by the m em bers o f  the Com monwealth in 1926.
They are autonomous Communities within the British F.mpire, equal in 
status, in no way subordinate one to the other in any aspect o f  their domestic 
or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and 
freely associated as members o f the British Commonwealth o f  Nations.56
T h e  validity o f  treating  the issue in term s o f  an interpretation o f  the 
pream ble o f  the B alfour Declaration is open to question as, in the words 
o f  K. C. W heare; “[i]t had all the advantages o f  flexibility and ambiguity, 
and all the disadvantages.”57 It does, however, indicate that all o f  the 
participants, including N ew foundland, were possessed o f  the fundam en­
tal elem ent o f  Dominion status — equality.
W hatever may be said about the application to Newfoundland o f 
particular provisions o f  the Statute of Westminster she was, at the very- 
least, an autonom ous, self-governing com m unity within the British 
Em pire. T h e  Prim e M inster o f  N ew foundland being a full participant at 
the post-war Im perial conferences along with the leaders o f  the o th er 
Dominions is indicative o f  its status as a Dominion. T he  elected 
governm ent o f N ew foundland was clearly sovereign domestically and, 
insofar as its external sovereignty was concerned, N ew foundland did not 
operate  u n d er any “constitutional” handicaps which did not also apply to 
the o th er Dominions.
s*Supra, footnote 43, at 816 (S.C.R.), 375 (D.L.R.).
isR. v. Burgess: Ex Parte Henry (1936), 55 Commonw. Law Rep. 608, at 635 (Aust. H.C.) (Kmphasis 
added ).
‘‘Report o f the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee, Imperial Conference, Summary o f Proceedings,
1926, Cmnd. 2768, 13-30, at 14.
i7Supra, footnote 42, at 28.
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Perhaps the most effective way to illustrate N ew foundland’s status 
p rio r to 1934 is to ask which governm ent, N ew foundland o r British, 
would have been entitled to jurisdiction over the continental shelf if such 
jurisdiction had crystallized as a principle o f international law prio r to 
February 16, 1934. In the opinion o f this au thor, jurisdiction would lie 
in the sovereign governm ent o f the coastal state, viz. the governm ent o f 
New foundland.
Commission Government, 1934-49
W hatever may be said o f N ew foundland's sovereignty p rio r to its 
financial difficulties in the 1930’s, it is clear that any such status, w hether 
dom estic o r international, was suspended du rin g  the period o f 
Commission G overnm ent. By 1933, the public debt had become so 
onerous that a Royal Commission recom m ended the tem porary 
suspension o f  responsible governm ent while the U nited Kingdom 
assum ed general responsibility for the finances o f the Island.58 At the 
request o f  the N ew foundland Legislature59 the British Parliam ent passed 
the Newfoundland Act, 1933.60 Letters Patent61 issued pursuan t to the Act 
abolished the bicameral legislature and established a Crow n-appointed 
Commission o f G overnm ent which consisted o f a governor and six 
commissioners, th ree from  N ew foundland and three from  Great Britain. 
U n d er the Letters Patent the Commission was to make laws for the 
“peace, welfare, and good governm ent” o f  N ew foundland.
It is clear from  the Resolution o f the New foundland legislature that 
the action was only to be a “suspension” in that the Commission was to 
continue “until such time as the Island may become self-supporting 
again.”62 W ith the prosperity o f  the Second W orld W ar, the economy o f 
the Island revived and in February 1946, plans were announced for a 
National Convention o f N ew foundlanders “to make recom m endations 
to His Majesty’s G overnm ent in the U nited Kingdom as to possible 
form s o f fu tu re governm ent to be put before the people at a national 
re ferendum .”63 T he  Commission com pleted its deliberations by January , 
1948, recom m ending to the British governm ent that a re ferendum  be 
held, placing two options on the ballot: (1) Responsible governm ent as it 
had existed prio r to 1934 and (2) Commission o f  G overnm ent.64 It is an
“ Newfoundland Royal Commission, 1933, Report. See Plumptre, A.F.W., “The Amulree Report (1933): 
A Review”, (1937) 3 Can. J. Econ. Pol. Set. 58.
SBAddress Presented to His Majesty by the Legislative Council and the House o f Assembly of 
Newfoundland, in 24 Geo. V, c. 2, First Schedule (U.K.).
••24 Geo. V. c. 2 (U.K.).
"R oyal Letters Patent, Jan. 30, 1934, in 23 & 24 Geo. V (2d. Sess.), (Nfld.).
*2Supra, footnote 59.
*3An Act Relating to a National Convention, no. 16 o f 1946 (Nfld.).
*4Signed Recommendations o f the Newfoundland National Convention.
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ironic m easure o f N ew foundland’s sovereign status du ring  Commission 
o f  G overnm ent that the ballot presented to the voters in the referendum  
included a th ird  option — C onfederation with C anada.65 This alternative 
was added to the ballot by the Commission in spite o f  the fact that it had 
been rejected by twenty-nine votes to sixteen in the National 
C onvention.66 It is difficult to imagine a m ore poignant rem inder that, 
d u rin g  the period o f  Commission Governm ent, N ew foundland was not a 
sovereign state.
Two re fe ren d a  were requ ired  to ultim ately settle the issue; 
C onfederation won a majority in the referendum  o f  July 22, i ()48, 
receiving 78,323 votes as com pared with 71,334 votes for Responsible 
G overnm ent.67 Following negotiation o f  the final term s o f  union, the 
C anadian Parliam ent passed An Act to Approve the Terms of Union of 
Newfoundland with Canada68 and adopted an Address to His Majesty69 
requesting that Parliam ent am end the British North America Act'. By 
M arch 23, the British North America Act, 194 9 70 had been passed by the 
British Parliam ent and March 31, 1949, was proclaimed as the date on 
which the act o f  union would take effect. Technically speaking 
N ew foundland’s entry into C onfederation had been approved by six 
British-appointed Commissioners and a British-appointed G overnor, the 
only legislation required  being an act o f  the British Parliam ent.71 This, 
in itself, is blunt testimony to N ew foundland’s lack o f  sovereign status 
between 1934 and 1949. If  it were not for a clarification o f 
N ew foundland’s constitutional status before its entry into C onfederation, 
any claim it m ight assert to jurisdiction which arose du ring  the period o f 
Commission o f  G overnm ent would be specious, to say th '“ least.
®Mn Act to Proitde for Ascertaining at a Referendum the Wish o f the People as to the Future Form of Government 
o f Newfoundland, no. 9 o f 1948, Art. 2 (Nfld.).
••See Chadwick, St. J., supra, footnote 44, at 201.
•’See Mayo, H. B.. “Newfoundland's Entry into the Dominion,” (1949) 15 Can. J. Econ. Pol. Sci. 505. In 
the first referendum  of June 3, 1948 the voting was as follows:
Total votes as per cent of the electorate 88.36%
M13 Geo. VI. c. 1 (Can.).
"F o r  text, see Chadwick, St. J., supra, footnote 44, at 217.
7#12 & 13 Geo. VI. c. 22 (U.K.).
’ 'In  Currie et al. v. MacDonald et nL (No. 436 of 1948, Nfld. S.C.) (unreported) six members o f the 
pre-1934 Newfoundland Parliament contested the constitutionality of the Confederation procedure, 
seeking declarations and an injunction against the Governor and the six members of the Commission of 
Government. Basically the contentions o f the plaintiffs were:
1. Commission o f  Government for five years
2. Confederation with Canada
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— That the Commission had a legal duty to restore Responsible Government as soon as the Island was 
self-supporting.
— That the Commission had no power to add "Confederation" to the ballot in the Referendum.
— That s. 146 o f the B.N.A. Act, 1867, which provided for Newfoundland to be admitted upon an 
Address to the British Parliament from both the Canadian and Newfoundland Parliaments, was the 
only appropriate means to effect Confederation and that the Commission did not have the power to 
make such an address.
— That, under the constitutional law of the Commonwealth, the Imperial Parliament had no power to 
make a law providing for the Confederation o f  Newfoundland and Canada except at the request o f 
a parliament elected by the people o f Newfoundland.
The case was heard in the trial division by Dunfield J. on December 6, 1948, and judgment given 
December 13.
Dunfield |. found against the plaintiffs on the ground that the pleadings disclosed no reasonable 
cause o f ac tion, striking out the whole Statement of Claim as the action was vexatious or frivolous. He 
went into the contentions o f the plaintiffs at some length however, “because it deals with matters in 
which the public is interested or concerned." Among his observations:
On the Status o f the Plaintiffs:
I know o f no precedent for a case where ordinary citizens take legal prcxeedings against 
their legislature in respect o f its legislative Acts, nor has any been cited by Counsel; but the 
ordinary principle in a case o f complaint o f excess o f authority against a public body is that 
those complaining must show themselves to be as individuals peculiarly injured over and above 
citizens generally. But the plaintiffs do not show that; on the contrary they proceed simply as 
citizens. It appears to me that they have no right to proceed, or to set themselves up  as 
representing any part o f the public. The protection of the public generally is a matter for 
governmental authority, and specifically for the Attorney General, (at 8)
O n the Status o f the Defendants:
In so far as the defendants are the Legislature, with full powers, as clearly dec ided, they 
cannot be sued; you cannot sue a legislature, nor tell it what acts it may or may not pass. And it 
is not a legal person, like a company, (at II)
On Imperial Constitutional Law:
This purports to be a constitutional case, and we cannot deal with it in a rarefied 
atmosphere o f theory, apart from the facts. Constitutional law, in non-Federal British countries, 
like the so-called International law, is for the most part not law at all, but a system of customs 
and conventions which the Courts do not enforce: and it deals with the distribution o f that 
ultimate reality, power, which is above both Courts and nations. If I may put it somewhat 
metaphoric ally. Leviathan can be bound only with ropes o f steel, and the attempt to bind him 
w ith gossamer webs o f words lacks reality, (at 2)
But the British Empire is a unitary state, with one Supreme Legislature, the King, Lords 
and Commons, and no written Constitution; New Zealand is unitary; Newfoundland is a 
subordinate unitary and many other Overseas territories; and in these cases the supremacy of 
the Legislature is the central principle o f the law. The Imperial Parliament is supreme in the 
Empire, subjec t to the observation that in the cases o f Canada, and some other Dominions, it has 
by the Statute o f Westminster abdicated the right to legislate fot them without their consent. 
O ther unitary legislatures in the Empire are sti'! subject to the overruling power o f the Imperial 
Parliament, which could abolish anything from Magna Carta downwards. What is called 
Constitutional law under that system is a mass o f conventions and customs, which are not law. 
For example, the obligation on a government to resign when defeated in its Parliament is an 
obligatory custom; not a law. No Court could enforce it, though failure to resign would 
eventually and indirectly bring about collisions with the law. In British unitary constitutions no 
Court can overrule the Legislature, (at 17-18)
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And further, Parliament can make any law whatsoever binding on us or on anybody else in 
the Empire. Certain Dominions have adopted the Statute o f Westminster, and Parliament will 
not legislate for them without their consent. But New foundland has not adopted it. (at 6-7)
On Newfoundland’s Status U nder Commission o f Government:
To my mind nothing can be clearer than that all this reduces the Island to the status of a 
pure Crown Colony, wherein the Crown’s Governor, with his nominated Council, is the ruler 
without any assistance from the people. Parliament says nothing about any limitation on the 
Crown's powers; it retires from the field for the time being. And it seems to be perfectly clear 
that the Crown is the judge of when, if at all, representative institutions are to be restored. For 
no one, save Parliament, can force it. (at 10B)
On the Im port o f s. 146 o f B.N.A. Act:
But what is Section 146 o f the British North America Act? It is a section put in in 1867 or 
thereabouts by the Canadian and British draftsmen, with which Newfoundland representatives 
may or may not have had anything to do. At that time it was contemplated that Newfoundland 
was going to join with the other North American Colonies in forming the new Dominion; and a 
quick and easy way o f entry was accordingly provided. But that was merely a matter o f 
convenience. T here is nothing binding about it today. T here can be nothing to prevent the same 
power which provided that way from providing another way convenient to the circumstances of 
the present day. Section 146 was meant to facilitate, not to exclude, (at 14)
To put it another way; what difference would it make if it were decided that an Address 
was necessary under Section 146 and that the Governor and Commission could not pass that 
Address? Parliament, knowing the result o f the Referendum and negotiations, could act without 
an Address, and alter Section 146 accordingly, (at 16)
On Confederation:
These things are overriding Acts o f State, done by paramount power which is the sole judge 
of its own actions, and done with the assent o f a majority o f our own people, (at 16)
The decision o f Dunfield J. was appealed to the Newfoundland Court o f  Appeal where judgment 
was rendered January 22, 1949. The Court o f  Appeal unanimously upheld the decision o f the trial 
judge. Interestingly, one o f  the three judges on the appeal was Dunfield J. who. not surprisingly, 
found: “I have little to add to what I said in my original judgm ent.”
Emerson C.J. took the view that the case could be decided on the basis o f standing: "Surely if ever 
there was a case in which action could be taken only by the Attorney-General this is one." (at 4)
As for an argument that there was an obligation upon the Commission and the Imperial 
government in the Schedule o f the Newfoundland Act, 1933 wherein it is stated: "It would be understood 
that, as soon as the Island's difficulties have been overcome and the Country is again self-supporting, 
responsible government, on the request o f the people o f Newfoundland, would be restored;" Emerson 
C.J. responded as follows:
As to this so-called contract: there never was and there never could have been any such 
thing. Parliament cannot bind itself and it cannot bind future parliaments. It may order one 
thing one day and revoke its decision the next, regardless o f results. The only consequences that 
can follow any act o f parliament are political. No Court can question its authority and it cannot 
be enjoined by any Court in respect thereof, (at 10)
T he judgment of Winter J. concurred with both the Chief Justice and Dunfield )., in respec t of the 
locus standi of the plaintiffs. As for the status o f  the defendants, W inter J. had this to say:
Still more striking is the case o f the defendants who, putting aside altogether the joining of 
the Governor as a defendant, are sued in both their executive and their legislative capac ities. 
The form er would be bad enough, but I think this must be the first time on record anywhere, in 
the British Commonwealth at least, that anyone has sought to bring all the members o f a 
legislature to account in a court o f law for their actions in that character, (at 2)
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The Effect of Term 7
O n M arch 31, 1949, N ew foundland became C anada’s tenth 
province. A single clause in the term s o f  union provided for a provincial 
constitution:
PROVINCIAL C O NSTITU TIO N
7. T he (k)nstitution o f  Newfoundland as it existed immediately prior to the 
sixteenth day o f  February, 1934, is revived at the date o f  Union and shall, 
subject to these terms and the British North America Acts, 1867 to 1946, 
continue as the Constitution o f  the Province o f  Newfoundland from and after 
the date o f  Union, until altered under the authority o f  the said Acts.72
If, as it appears, the effect o f  this provision was to revive the pre-1934 
constitution for an instant before N ew foundland en tered  C onfederation, 
that instant could be very consequential to the resolution o f the offshore 
minerals issue. It is conceivable that, instantaneously, a backlog o f 
appurtenances evolved at international law in the years 1934-49 would 
accrue to the Dominion o f N ew foundland before its entry into 
C onfederation with C anada. T h e  view that N ew foundland en tered  
C onfederation as an independent Dominion ra th e r than a Crown colony 
is consistent with it having “suspended” ra th er than “revoked” 
responsible governm ent in 1934. T erm  7 appears to confirm  that 
independent status. It has been suggested73 that T erm  7 was included 
only to specify which legal docum ent was to serve as the constitution o f 
the new province. T his is not necessarily contrary to the view o f  the 
New foundland governm ent74 as it simply contends that T erm  7 is a
As to the holding o f the Referendum and Confederation . . .
[t]he really important question, which is rather this: will even the plaintiffs contend that the 
matter o f Confederation should not in any case have had to be submitted to, and decided upon, 
by the people o f Newfoundland themselves? So to contend would make it possible for an elected 
government to force Confederation upon the people against their will, or that of a majority o f 
them. In a matter o f this sort the government acts, so at least it seems to me, solely as the agent 
o f the people. If the plaintiffs' view is the correct one, it means that the trouble, expense and, it 
might fairly be said, the unpleasantness o f preparing for and carrying out a general elec tion was 
necessary in o rder to create an agent to do what the principal could himself do directly, and 
what in fact he has now done. The simple truth seems to me to be plain, that the peculiar 
constitutional status of Newfoundland in 1946 and 1948 was, for this purpose at least, a distinct 
advantage in that it permitted a question o f  such vital importance to the Newfoundland people 
to be referred to them direcdy and immediately, (at 12-13)
Having failed at trial and on appeal, the Plaintiffs sought and were granted leave to appeal to the 
Privy Council. T he Appeal was withdrawn, however, on May 16, 1949, ostensibly because the act sought 
to be enjoined. Confederation, was already completed.
7tSchedule: Terms o f Unton o f Newfoundland with Canada 13 Geo. VI, c. 1 (Can.).
TSIppolitto, J. T ., “Newfoundland and the Continental Shelf: From Cod to Oil and Gas’’, (1976) 15 
Columbia J. Trans. Law  138, at 161.
74Martin, C., supra, footnote 35, at 41-2.
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reinstatem ent o f  its pre-existing sovereignty, a fact which would seem to 
be an unavoidable corollary o f the revivification o f  the constitution. T o  
suggest any conclusion o th er than a m om entary re tu rn  to the pre-1934 
status would appear to pu t C onfederation itself in doubt.
T h e  in tent o f  T erm  7 is clear. N ew foundland en tered  C onfedera­
tion with the constitution which it enjoyed prio r to 1934; that o f  a 
Dominion o f the British Com m onwealth with its own representative, 
responsible and sovereign institutions. Even though that status may have 
been only fictionally revived for purposes o f C onfederation , it is m ore 
than a technicality. It entitles N ew foundland to benefit from  any new 
developm ents o f  international law which may have arisen up to March 
31, 1949 in the same fashion as it would have benefitted therefrom  prio r 
to 1934. If  N ew foundland had sufficient international sovereignty prio r 
to February 16, 1934 to benefit from  such developm ents as a custom ary 
right to jurisd iction in the offshore area, then the effect o f  T erm  7 was 
to revive such status immediately prio r to C onfederation.
THE PARAMOUNT CONCERNS OF FEDERALISM
N ew foundland is in a unique position insofar as its claim to juris­
diction over the continental shelf is concerned, but it is not the first 
m em ber o f a federal state to attem pt to assert a claim to its offshore 
areas. T h e  issue o f  state claims to the territorial sea75 and seabed has 
been extensively litigated in the U nited States, Australia and to a lesser 
extent, in Canada. T hese adjudications reveal some com m on features o f 
federalism  which do not always conform  to strict legal analysis and 
which are not favourable to claims such as those o f  Newfoundland.
United States
Shortly after W orld W ar II, the offshore resources o f  the United 
States became a contentious issue and the federal governm ent opted to 
resolve the m atter by adjudication. T h e  first action was that o f  U.S. v. 
California76 where the A ttorney-G eneral o f  the United States sought a 
declaration that the federal governm ent was “the ow ner in fee simple of, 
o r possessed o f  param ount rights in and powers over, the lands m inerals 
and o th er things o f  value underlying the Pacific Ocean, lying seaward o f  
the ordinary  low-water . . . m ark and outside the inland waters o f the 
State.”77 California claimed title on the basis that a three-m ile belt was
75The discussion in this section will deal with adjudications respecting both the continental shelf and the 
territorial sea. The principles upon which the cases have been ultimately dec ided, generally in favour o f 
the federal claim, are equally applicable to a potential claim by Newfoundland to either its continental
shelf or its territorial sea.
7*(1947), 332 U.S. 19; 67 S. Ct. 1658. Hereinafter all citations are to “U.S.” report.
77lbid., at 22.
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included within the original boundaries o f the state. Mr. Justice Black, 
delivering the opinion o f the Court, was impressed by two aspects o f  the 
federal position:
The United States here asserts rights in two capacities transcending those 
o f a mere property owner. In one capacity it asserts the right and 
responsibility to exercise whatever power and dominion are necessary to 
protect this country against dangers to the security and tranquillity o f its 
people incident to the fact that the United States is located immediately 
adjacent to the ocean. T he Government also appears in its capacity as a 
member o f the family o f nations. In that capacity it is responsible for 
conducting United States relations with other nations. It asserts that proper 
exercise o f these constitutional responsibilities requires that it have power, 
unencumbered by state commitments, always to determine what agreements 
will be made concerning the control and use o f the marginal sea and the land 
under it.78
Mr. Justice Black went on to hold that “national interests, 
responsibilities, and therefore rights, are paramount.”79 He also found 
against California on the basis o f the “equal footing” clause whereby 
California, as was to be the case with all subsequent entrants to the 
Union, was admitted in 1849 “on an equal footing with the original 
States in all respects whatever”.80 As for the status o f the territorial sea 
at the time o f  the original union, the Supreme Court found that the idea 
was but “a nebulous suggestion.”81
In 1950, the U.S. Attorney-General sought a similar declaration 
against Louisiana and Texas. T h e  Louisiana judgm ent was delivered first, 
and Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court82 did not devote any 
discussion to the historical issues. A rather brief judgm ent relied solely 
upon the paramount federal concerns.
T he marginal sea is a national, not a state concern. National interests, 
national responsibilities, national concerns are involved. T h e problems of  
comm erce, national defense, relations with other powers, war and peace focus 
there. National rights must therefore be paramount in that area.
That is the rationale o f United States v. State o f  California. It is fully 
elaborated in the opinion of the Court in that case and does not need 
repetition.83
It is readily apparent in the short majority judgm ent in the Louisiana 
case that the true rationale o f the decision is the Court’s concern for
“ Ju stice  Fran k fu rter, dissenting.
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what it considers to be paramount national rights. I f  this was not already 
clear, it became so in the decision o f  U.S. v. Texas,** handed down by the 
Court on the same day as the Louisiana decision.
T h e Texas case presented a unique historical position. While 
Louisiana had been forged out o f  territory purchased by the United 
States, Texas had been an independent republic prior to joining the 
Union in 1845. T h e essential elements o f  T exas’ status at the time o f 
Union are set out by Mr. Justice Douglas in his judgm ent:
T he Republic o f Texas was proclaimed by a convention on March 2,
1836. T he United States and other nations formally recognized it. T he  
Congress o f Texas on December 19, 1836, passed an act defining the 
boundaries o f the Republic. T h e southern boundary was described as follows: 
“beginning at the mouth o f the Sabine river, and running west along the Gulf 
o f Mexico three leagues from land, to the mouth o f the Rio G rande."85
Mr. Justice Douglas concluded that T exas, at the time o f Union, had 
full sovereignty over the marginal sea as well as ownership and control 
o f the underlying wealth and resources. He proceeded to deny its claim 
to actual sovereignty on the basis o f  the “equal footing” clause. He held 
that, whereas the “equal footing” clause had been applied to impliedly 
augment the powers o f some States, the converse was also true; the 
“equal footing” clause could negate aspects o f sovereignty expressly held 
by States at the time o f  union. T h e  act o f  union apparently entailed a 
relinquishment o f sovereignty to the federal government, particularly in 
the areas o f national defence and international relations. It was found to 
be an incident o f that transfer o f  sovereignty that Texas relinquished all 
rights to the marginal sea. Perhaps the real concern o f  the Court is 
revealed in a comment on the “equal footing” clause:
The ‘‘equal footing" clause prevents extension o f the sovereignty of a 
State into a domain o f political and sovereign power o f the United States 
from which the other States have been excluded, just as it prevents a 
contraction o f sovereignty . . . which would produce inequality among States.
For equality o f States means that they are not “less or greater, o r different in 
dignity o r power".88
T h e dissent87 from this judgm ent was more vigorous than in the 
California or Louisiana cases and Mr. Justice Reed illustrated one o f  the 
serious shortcomings in the majority position.
T he needs o f defense and foreign affairs alone cannot transfer 
ownership o f an ocean bed from a state to the Federal Government any more
**V.S. v. Texas (1950), 339  U .S. 707 , 70  S. C t. 918 . All citations are to “U .S ."  Report.
8TJu stices Fran kfurter, Reid, and M itton dissented. Ju stices  Jack son  and Clark took no part in 
consideration o r decision o f  the case.
" I b i d . ,  at 713.
* * lb td ., at 719-20.
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than they could transfer iron ore under uplands from state to federal 
ownership. National responsibility is no greater in respect to the marginal sea 
than it is toward every other particle of American territory. In my view,
Texas owned the marginal area by virtue o f its original proprietorship; it has 
not been shown to my satisfaction that it lost it by the terms o f the Resolution 
o f Annexation.88
T h e position o f Mr. Justice Reed is a convincing one. I f  Texas, 
recognized as an independent nation by the United States, had 
jurisdiction over certain offshore areas previous to its union with the 
United States, it ought to require an express term o f union to transfer 
that jurisdiction to the federal government, rather than a “swinging 
door” approach to the “equal footing” clause. Dean Roscoe Pound wrote 
a scathing case comment on the Texas decision, adopting the view that 
there is no logical nor legal reason to treat the dominium in the same 
fashion as the imperium. Dean Pound stated: “[t]he proposition is not the 
common law, is not international law, and is not involved in, much less 
required by, the constitutional powers and responsibilities o f the United 
States.”89 T h e  United States Congress reacted swiftly to the decisions, 
enacting in 1953 the Submerged Lands Act,90 extending the seaward 
boundaries o f  the states.91
Whatever may be the critical comment on this series o f  decisions, 
they are instructive on the Newfoundland situation in one respect; they 
illustrate how a federal court may be motivated by considerations for 
national concerns which tend to override strict legal analysis.
Australia
In 1975 all six Australian states joined to challenge Commonwealth 
legislation which claimed sovereign federal jurisdiction over the 
territorial sea, its bed and the continental shelf.92 T h e Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act, 197393 purported to be an implementation o f the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf and the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. T h e central provisions o f the Act are:
Part II —  Sovereignty and Sovereign Rights 
Division I — The Territorial Sea
6. It is by this Act declared and enacted that the sovereignty in respect o f the 
territorial sea, and in respect o f the airspace over it and in respect o f  its bed 
and subsoil, is vested in and exercisable by the Crown in right o f the 
Commonwealth.
"Ibid., at 723.
••Pound, R., "C ritiqu e on the T ex as  T id elands Case”, (1951 ) 3 Baylor Law Rev 120, at 122.
•#43 U .S.C .A . secs. 1301 ft seq.
• 'T h e boundaries o f  all coastal States are  extended to  a point three miles seaward o f  the coast. In the 
case o f  Florida and T exas, the seaward boundary in the G u lf o f  M exico is three leagues (approx. nine 
miles) from  the coast.
**New South Wales v. Commonwealth, supra, footnote 35.
*3No. 161 o f  1973 (Com ).
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Division 2  — The Continental Shelf
I I . It is by this Act declared and enacted that the sovereign rights o f  
Australia as a coastal State in respect o f the continental shelf o f Australia, for 
the purpose o f exploring it and exploiting its natural resources, are vested in 
and exercisable by the Crown in right o f the Commonwealth.
T h e Court was unanimous in holding that the Commonwealth was 
sovereign with respect to the continental shelf, as none o f  the colonies 
prior to 190194 had made any claims to such jurisdiction.
Five members o f the Court95 upheld the claim o f Commonwealth 
sovereignty over the bed o f the territorial sea. T h e  net result o f  the 
decision is that the territory o f the Australian states is delimited by the 
low-water mark or the outer limit o f inland waters.96
T hree o f  the five majority opinions97 concluded that the historical issue 
o f  the status o f the territorial sea was determined by the 1876 decision o f 
the English Exchequer Division in R. v. Keyn. 98 Both dissenting 
judgm ents extensively canvassed the nineteenth century cases and 
rejected the authority o f  R. v. Keyn, one o f them characterizing it as 
“erroneous”.99 Jacobs J .  joined the two dissenting justices in rejecting the 
authority o f  Keyn,100 upholding the Commonwealth legislation on other 
grounds. Given the controversial status101 o f R. v. Keyn, it is not
“ Australian C onfederation  was provided for by the Commonwealth o f  Australia Constitution Act, 63  8c 64 
V iet., c. 12 (U .K .). T h e  union becam e effective 1 Jan u ary , 1901.
**Gibbs and Stephen J J .  dissenting.
•*For case com m ents on New south South Wales v. Commonwealth, see Goldsworthy, P., (1976) 50  Aust. L .J. 175; 
also “C rren t T o p ics”, (1976) 50  Aust. L .J . 153. For a discussion o f  the Australian issue generally, see: 
O 'C onnell, D. P., "Problem s o f  Australian Coastal Ju risd ictio n ”, (1958) 34 Bnt. Y. B. Intl. Law  199.
* 7/Vr Barwick C .J ., at 8 -13 ; M cTiernan J .  at 20 -22 ; Mason J .  at 84-90 .
»»(1876), 2 Ex. D. 63.
**N.S.W. v. Commonwealth, supra, footnote 35, at 37 , per Gibbs J.
\
{00Ibid., at 103-108.
l01T h e  original decision in R. v. Keyn was participated in by thirteen judges, each delivering separate 
jud gm en ts, the ultim ate m ajority being 7 to 6. Keyn. a G erm an national, was the com m ander o f  the 
“ Franconia”, a foreign  ship which collided with a British fishing vessel within th ree miles o f  the 
low-water m ark. T h e  British vessel sank and Keyn was charged with m anslaughter. T h e  issue before the 
E xch equer Division was w hether English courts had either crim inal or admiralty jurisdiction  to try the 
com m ander. W ith thirteen ju d gm en ts covering one hundred seventy-six pages a ratio decidendi o f  the 
case is rather elusive as some judgm ents are based on com m on law while others are  based on 
international developm ents. T w o subsequent decisions (flam s  v. Franconia (1877), 4 6  L .J .Q .B . 363 
(Q .B .) and Blackpool Pier Co. v. Fylde Union (1877), 36  L .T . 251 (C .P .)) found that Keyn stands for the 
proposition that the realm  o f  England extends only to the low-water m ark.
T h e  Privy Council, on the o ther hand, in Secretary o f  State fo r  India m Council v. Chalikan Rama Rao 
(1916 ), 32 T .L .R . 6 5 2 ; 85 L .J.P .C . 222 , restricted the significance o f  the Keyn decision to the issue o f  the 
limits o f  the Admiralty ju r iv  iction. Lord Shaw, speaking for the Privy Council stated: " It  should not be 
forgotten  that that case has re feren ce on its m erits solely to the point as to the limits o f  Admiralty 
ju risd iction ; nothing else fell to be decided th ere", at 224  (L .J.P .C .); 65 3  (T .L .R .). See also: O ’C o n ­
nell, D. P., “T h e  Federal Problem  C oncerning the M aritim e Domain in Com monw ealth C ountries", 
(1 9 7 0 ) 1 J .  Mar. Law  fc? Com. 389.
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surprising that the justices in the majority relied upon alternative 
grounds to support their decisions.
Murphy J .  did not devote any analysis to the historical aspects, 
relying instead upon the external affairs102 power o f  the Commonwealth 
government. He says o f the states: “[e]ven if they had become 
independent nations before 1901 with the sovereign rights o f  an 
international state, on federation they would have lost the territorial seas 
and other attributes o f  international personality.”103 Perhaps he reveals 
his true concern when he says:
T h e area of the disputed submarine lands and sub-soil is millions of 
square kilometres. T heir resources are probably worth thousands o f  billions 
o f dollars. They belong to the nation not to the States. The rights over them 
are vested in and exercisable by the Government o f Australia on behalf o f  all 
the people o f Australia.104
In this passage Murphy J .  is raising a point which, whatever its 
significance in getting the issue before the Court, has absolutely nothing 
to do with a determination as to which level o f government ought to 
have jurisdiction. While he is the only member o f the majority to be so 
frank one suspects that some o f the others may have been motivated by 
similar concerns. Barwick C .J., after examining the American decisions 
and the decision o f the Supreme Court o f Canada in the B.C. Offshore 
Minerals Reference, concluded that the federal interest in offshore 
jurisdiction was an essential feature o f a federation;
This result conform s, in my opinion, to an essential feature o f a 
federation, namely, that it is the nation and not the integers o f the federation 
which must have the power to protect and control as a national function the 
area o f the marginal seas, the sea-bed and airspace, and the continental shelf 
and incline. This has been decided by the Supreme Couits o f the United
States and o f C anada.......... I can find no reason to differentiate in relevant
respects the circumstances o f this federation from those o f the other great 
federations.105
Another important consideration for Barwick C .J. was the 
determination that: . . once [the] low water mark is passed the 
international domain is reached.”106 But such considerations are no 
substitute for a reasoned legal analysis o f  the sovereignty which the 
Australian states possessed at the time o f union in 1901. If, at that time, 
they exercised jurisdiction over the waters and sea-bed o f  the territorial 
sea, no comparison with Canada or the United States could relieve them
101Commonwealth o f  Australia Constitution Act, supra; footnote 96 , s. 51(xxix).
103N.S.W. v. Commonwealth, supra, footnote 35 , at 119 per M urphy J .
' 0 ,lb u l., at 120.
l0Slb id ., at 16-17, Barwick C.J.
,M lb id„  at 15.
NEWFOUNDLAND’S CONTINENTAL SHELF 113
o f it. While comparisons may be instructive for academic purposes, they 
offer no solution to jurisdictional issues where the relevant considera­
tions are unique historical situations and the particular terms o f union. 
Surely the obtuse “equal footing” argument which deprived Texas o f  its 
offshore jurisdiction could not be transposed to resolve the Australian 
question.
It is submitted that what we are seeing in the Australian situation, as 
in the United States, is a reliance by national courts upon political 
considerations which are unnecessary to a determination o f  what is 
ostensibly a legal issue.
Canada
Canadian courts, prior to 1963, studiously avoided any comment on 
the proprietary interest in the sea-bed below the low water mark. T h e 
question was raised in Attorney-General for British Columbia v. 
Attorney-General for Canada107 but, as that case dealt with fisheries 
jurisdiction the Privy Council chose not to consider the proprietary 
question.
In the argument before their Lordships much was said as to an alleged 
proprietary title in the Province to the shore around its coast within a marine 
league. . . But their Lordships feel themselves relieved from expressing any 
opinion on the question whether the Crown has a right o f property in the bed 
of the sea below the low water mark to what is known as the three-mile limit 
because they are o f opinion that the right o f the public to fish in the sea has 
been well established in Knglish law for many centuries and does not depend 
on the assertion or maintenance o f  any title in the Crown to the subjacent 
land.1**
Similarly the Privy Council again deferred from any discussion o f  the 
proprietary issue in Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for 
Quebec. 109
In 1963, a five member bench o f the Nova Scotia Court o f  Appeal 
was faced with the issue o f  whether a municipality could tax 
undertakings which extend underwater beyond the low water mark. In 
that case110 it was the Municipality o f the County o f Cape Breton 
attempting to tax the mining operations o f Dominion Coal Co. whose 
operations extended into Spanish Bay beyond the low water mark but 
not beyond the three-mile limit. A majority o f the C ourt111 held that
,07[ I 9 I 4 ]  A C . 153 (P.C .).
at 174.
,0' ( I 9 2 I ]  1 A .C. 401 , at 431 (P.C.).
"°R r: Dommum Coal Co. Ltd. and County o f  Capt Breton (1963), 4 0  D .L .R . (2d) 593.
'" C u r r ie  J . ,  dissenting.
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there was no authority in the municipality to tax beyond its limits. Those 
limits were defined in an Order in Council o f  1824, hence there was no 
need to enter a debate as to the competence to tax submarine 
installations within the three-mile limit. MacDonald J .  and Currie J . ,  
however, entered into the debate and arrived at differing conclusions; 
the latter taking much the same approach as was later taken by Stephen 
and Gibbs JJ. in their dissents in the New South Wales case. He isolated 
Reg. v. Keyn by examining numerous other nineteenth and twentieth 
century cases expressing a contrary point o f  view and concluded: “T h e 
subsoil in territorial waters belongs to the Provinces rather than to 
Canada, subject to certain reservations in the B.N.A. Act."112 MacDonald 
J . ,  on the other hand, relied upon Reg. v. Keyn to determine that the 
boundary o f the realm did not extend beyond the low water mark. An 
interesting comment by MacDonald J .  was made in reference to the 
decision o f  the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. California: “[t]he question 
whether property rights in territorial waters do exist is highly doubtful, 
and particularly so in a Federal system.”113 This observation is intriguing. 
T h e  proposition that property rights in the territorial sea bed, whether 
they exist or not as a concept o f  international law, might depend on 
whether the coastal state had a federal system o f government as opposed 
to, say, a unitary one is a perceptive critique o f the reasoning in the 
American decisions. Obviously the existence o f  a principle o f  
international law is an issue completely independent o f the political 
arrangements in the particular coastal state where it is being adjudicated. 
That MacDonald J .  might have such doubts based on the American 
cases, however, is understandable.
In April o f  1865 the federal government referred to the Supreme 
Court o f Canada the following questions:
1. In respect o f the lands, including the mineral and other natural resources, 
o f the sea bed and subsoil seaward from the ordinary low-water mark on the 
coast o f the mainland and the several islands o f British Columbia, outside the 
harbours, bays, estuaries and other similar inland waters, to the outer limit o f  
the territorial sea o f Canada, as defined in the Territorial Sea and Fishing 
Zones Act, Statutes o f Canada 1964, Chapter 22 , as between Canada and 
British Columbia,
(a) Are the said lands the property o f Canada or British Columbia?
(b) Has Canada or British Columbia the right to explore and exploit the said 
lands?
(c) Has Canada o r British Columbia legislative jurisdiction in relation to the 
said lands?
2. In respect o f the mineral and other natural resources o f the sea bed and 
subsoil beyond that part o f the territorial sea o f  Canada referred to in 
Question 1, to a depth o f 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the
1,1I b i d at 6 2 0 , per C urrie J .
" 3lbtd.. at 630, per Mac Donald J. (emphasis added).
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depth o f the superjacent waters admits o f the exploitation o f the mineral and 
other natural resources o f the said areas, as between Canada and British 
Columbia,
(a) Has Canada o r British Columbia the right to explore and exploit the said 
mineral and other natural resources?
(b) Has Canada o r British Columbia legislative jurisdiction in relation to the 
said mineral and other natural resources?114
When the issue was heard by the Supreme Court, the provinces o f 
Ontario, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and 
Newfoundland intervened on the part o f  British Columbia. In the 
result115 all five questions were answered “Canada”.
Questions 2(a) and 2(b), those relating to jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf, apparently did not give the Court much cause for 
deliberation. After setting out the Trum an Proclamation and the 1958 
Geneva Convention, the Court, having already determined that the 
territorial sea was outside the boundaries o f British Columbia, 
concluded: “T h ere is no historical, legal or constitutional basis upon 
which the Province o f  British Columbia could claim the right to explore 
and exploit or claim legislative jurisdiction over the resources o f the 
continental shelf.”116
It was to the questions respecting the territorial sea that the Court 
devoted most o f its judgm ent. T h e decision o f  the Exchequer Division in 
Reg. v. Keyn was heavily relied upon to support a conclusion that, at the 
time o f  Confederation in 1871; the realm o f  England and hence British 
Columbia, did not extend beyond the lower water mark. Thus the 
territorial sea lay outside the limits o f British Columbia at the time o f 
Confederation, providing a simple answer to the question o f  jurisdiction 
in the territorial sea or ownership o f the underlying bed. T h e opinion o f 
Currie J. in Dominion Coal was cautiously described as obiter. T h e Privy 
Council decision in Secretary of State for India in Council v. Chelikani Rama 
Raou 7 was referred to but no mention was made o f Lord Shaw’s 
delimitation o f R. v. Keyn. T h e  decision o f  the Newfoundland Supreme
"*Rc: Offshore Mineral Rights o f  British Columbia, supra, footnote 43 , at 796 (S.C .R .), 3 56  (D .L .R .). For 
discussion o f  this decision see: Head, I., " T h e  Legal C lam our over Canadian O ffsh ore M inerals”, (1967 ) 
5 Alta, law Rev. 3 1 2 ; ‘T h e  Canadian O ffsh ore M inerals R eferen ce", (1968 ) 18 U. Toronto L.J. 131; Caplan, 
N., “Legal Issues o f  the O ffsh o re  M ineral Rights Dispute in Canada", (1968) 14 McGill L .J. 4 7 5 ; H arrison, 
R., supra, footnote 7 ; and Swan, G . S ., “T h e  N ewfoundland O ffsh ore claim s; In terface o f  C o n ­
stitutional Federalism  and International Law, (1976) 22 McGill L.J. 541 .
" ‘ T h e  decision was T h e  Jo in t  O pinion o f  T h e  Court.
"*lbid., at 821 (S .C .R .), 3 80  (D .L .R .).
" 7Supra, footnote 101.
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Court in Anglo-American Telegraph Co. v. Direct United States Cable Co.1,8 
was considered but fastidiously circumscribed on the basis that the Privy 
Council119 h a d ' upheld the judgm ent on the narrow ground that 
Conception Bay was within the boundaries o f Newfoundland by historic 
title.12” T h e Supreme Court considered some other authorities in a 
generally unsatisfactory fashion121 but did not deviate from its finding, 
mainly on the authority o f  R. v. Keyn, that the territory o f British 
Columbia ended at the low water mark at the time o f  Confederation.
Having reached this conclusion, the Court departed from its 
technical, historical approach to make brief and oblique allusions to two 
very broad policy justifications for federal jurisdiction: the federal power 
to make laws for the “peace, order and good government o f  Canada 
and the power over external affairs. T h e reference to the “peace, order 
and good government” power, completely unattended from the 
preceding analysis o f the case, is styled in almost identical fashion to 
Viscount Sim on’s classic formulation o f  what has come to be known as 
the “Canada Tem perance” test.122
"• (1875 ), 6  Nfld. Law Rep. 28  (S.C .). In this case the Newfoundland governm ent had granted one o f  
the parties a concession on cable operations “in any part o f  the territory o f  N ew foundland." T h e  o ther 
party had anchored a cable in C onception Bay but had not passed at any point within th ree miles o f  the 
low-water m ark. H oyles C .J . o f  the Suprem e C ourt o f  N ewfoundland found for the p lain tiff and m ade 
the following statem ent with respect to territorial waters (at 33):
I hold that th«1 territorial jurisdiction  o f  the sovereign extends to three m iles outside o f  a 
line drawn from  headland o f  the b a y .. . ;  that the local governm ent, being  the Q u een ’s 
governm ent, representing and exercising within the limits o f  the G overnor’s com m ission, which 
contains nothing restrictive upon this point, h er authority and jurisd iction  is. in this respect, the 
sam e with th e Im perial governm ent. . .and that, subject to the royal instructions and the Q ueen 's 
power o f  dissent, the Acts o f  the local legislature have full effect and operation to the full extent 
o f  that territoria l jurisdiction.
T h is  portion o f  the jud gm en t o f  H oyles C .J. was cited with approval in two subsequent N ewfoundland 
decisions: Rhodts v. Fcurweather (1888 ), 7 Nfld. Law Rep. 321 (C .A .); and Queen v. Delepine (1889 ), 7 
Nfld. Law Rep. 3 7 8  (S.C .).
" '( 1 8 7 7 ) ,  2 App. Cas. 394  (P.C .). No com m ent was m ade on the dicta o f  Hoyles C .J . as the Privy 
Council based its finding on the fact that Conception Bay was N ewfoundland territory by title.
,i0Re: Offshore Mineral Rights o f  British Columbia, supra, footnote 43  at 8 0 9  (S .C .R .); 368  (D .I..R .). T h e  
C ourt said the Conception Bay case "does not carry with it any general delegation by the British Crown 
over the territorial sea surrounding N ew foundland.”
' “ See H arrison. R. J . ,  supra, footnote 7, at 487 where he concludes: “T h e  reasoning o f  the Suprem e 
C ourt o f  Canada in Re: Offshore Mineral Rights o f  British Columbia, at least with respect to the territorial 
sea, is clearly open to  challenge, particularly in its interpretation o f  Keyn and its avoidance o f  the 
contrary authority, most notably the observations o f  the Privy Council in Chalikani."
Also the judgm ent o f  Stephen J . ,  in Neu’ South Wales v. Commonwealth, supra, footnote 35 , at 64  w here he 
says o f  the Canadian decision: “T h e  court was m uch influenced by its view o f  Keyn's Case but did, in my 
respectful opinion, m isconceive the issues in that case.”
,t2AUomey General fo r  Ontario v. Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] A .C. 193, at 20 5  (P.C .). “ In their 
Lordships' opinion , the true test must be found in the real subject m atter o f  the legislation: if it is such 
that it goes beyond local or provincial concern o r interests and must from  its inherent nature be the 
con cern  o f  the D om inion as a w h o le .. .then it will fall within the com petence o f  the Dominion 
Parliam ent as a m atter affecting the peace, o rd er, and good governm ent o f  Canada. . .  per Viscount 
Sim on. See H ogg. P. W ., Constitutional Law o f  Canada (1977), at 257-62 .
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Legislative jurisdiction with respect to such lands must, therefore, belong 
exclusively to Canada, for the subject matter is one not coming within the 
classes o f subjects assigned exclusively to the legislatures o f the provinces 
within the meaning o f the initial words o f s. 91 and may, therefore, properly 
be regarded as a m atter affecting Canada generally and covered by the 
expression “the peace, ord er and good government o f Canada”.
T he mineral resources o f the lands underlying the territorial sea are of  
concern to Canada as a whole and go beyond local o r provincial concern or 
interests.'23
This isolated reference to the “peace, order and good government” 
power without any discussion as to why offshore resources go beyond 
local or provincial concern is totally unsatisfactory. T h ere  is no analysis 
o f  the competing national and local interests so as to lead to the 
conclusion that this subject matter is one o f concern to Canada as a 
whole to the exclusion o f  provincial jurisdiction. Neither is there any 
analysis o f  what is so unique about offshore natural resources to exclude 
them from one o f  the classes o f  subjects reserved to the provinces. T o  
exclude provincial jurisdiction in matters where there are compelling 
arguments o f national concern may be necessary in a federal system. T o  
hold in favour o f  fédérai jurisdiction by a bare citation o f  the “peace, 
order and good government” power is unacceptable.
Having dealt briefly with the “national dimensions” o f  the subject 
matter, the Court alluded equally cryptically to the ability o f  the federal 
government to enter into international agreements.
Moreover, the rights in the territorial sea arise by international law and 
depend upon recognition by other sovereign states. Legislative jurisdiction in 
relation to the lands in question belongs to Canada which is a sovereign state 
recognized by international law and thus able to enter into arrangem ents with 
other states respecting the rights in the territorial sea.
Canada is a signatory to the Convention on the Territorial Sec. and Contiguous 
Zone and may become a party to other international treaties and conventions 
affecting rights in the territorial sea.124
T o  say that federal government has jurisdicticn because it was the 
one to enter into the treaties ignores the basic issue. O f course it was the 
federal government which entered into the international arrangements 
because in 1958 the federal govem m erc was the only level o f 
government in Canada capable o f undertaking such arrangements. But 
that does not provide a response to the question o f which level o f 
government has jurisdiction once it is recognized that Canada125 has such 
a right at international law.
' “ B.C. Offshore Minerals Reference, supra, footnote 43 , at 817  (S .C .R .), 376  (D .L .R .).
'"Ibid.
‘**See Ecuyer, G . L., La Cour supreme du Canada et le Partage des Compétences 1949-78  (1978 ), at 298 . “Le 
passage. . .illustre com m ent, dans cette affa ire , la C our Suprêm e a pu co n fon d re C anada’ et 
‘gouvernem ent féd éral’.”
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What these two passages reveal, especially in light o f  the inadequate 
analysis o f the historical issue, is that the Supreme Court o f  Canada in 
the B.C. Reference was motivated by political considerations which were 
not acknowledged by the Court. Given the similar disposition o f the 
courts in Australia and the United States to be swayed by “paramount 
national concerns”126 and “essential feature[s] o f a federation”;127 it is 
apparent that a province such as Newfoundland, without a watertight 
technical case, would run considerable risk in seeking an adjudication if 
similar political considerations were to prevail again in the Supreme 
Court o f  Canada.
The Effect of Term 37 of the Terms of Union
Newfoundland might argue that, even if the principle o f coastal 
state jurisdiction became a fact after 1949, the jurisdiction would still 
accrue to it by virtue o f  the Confederation arrangements. T h e  provision 
o f the Terms of Union which is most applicable is Term 37 :
Natural Resources.
37. All lands, mines, minerals, and royalties belonging to Newfoundland at 
the date o f Union, and all sums then due or payable for such lands, mines, 
minerals, or royalties, shall belong to the Province o f Newfoundland, subject 
to any trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any interest other than that o f  
the Province in the sam e.1*'
T h ere  are two impediments to an argument that this provision is 
decisive. T h e  word “belonging” implies ownership. T h e  resources o f the 
continental shelf do not belong to either Canada or Newfoundland. T h e 
coastal state has sovereign rights respecting the exploration and 
exploitation o f the resources o f the continental shelf but it does not own 
them. T h e more serious objection to reliance upon Term 37  is the 
phrase “at the date o f Union”. T h e effect o f  these words is a direct 
reversion to the historical analysis: did or did not Newfoundland 
enjoy jurisdiction at the time o f Confederation. Term 37  therefore 
appears to be o f little assistance in meeting the situation where it might 
be held that coastal state jurisdiction emerged after Confederation, 
unless it is possible to contend that by implication, as between the two 
levels o f  government, Newfoundland has a general jurisdiction over 
natural resources. At this point, however, we are getting into the realm 
o f  purely political considerations and if the Supreme Court o f  Canada 
was to adopt the same view as it did in the B.C. Reference with respect
v. Louisiana, supra, footnote 83 , at 9 1 7 , (S. Cl.) per D ouglas J .  
,t7N.S.W. v. Commonwealth, supra, footnote 35 , at 16 , per Barwick
Schedule, Terms o f  Union o f  Newfoundland with Canada, supra, footnote 72.
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to “national concerns”129 it might not be so impressed with the logic o f 
an argument for symmetry, i.e. that if  provinces have jurisdiction 
over onshore natural resources, the same policy should apply to offshore 
resources.
T h e  net effect is that Term 37  is not o f  much assistance in resolving 
the offshore issue. I f  coastal state jurisdiction was customary before 
1949, the jurisdiction would remain with Newfoundland in the absence 
o f an express provision to the contrary whether or not Term 37  is 
interpreted as being inapplicable due to the use o f  the word 
“belonging”.130 On the other hand, since it would have no direct bearing 
on developments subsequent to Confederation, the basic issue is still 
whether or not Newfoundland was entitled to jurisdiction over offshore 
resources prior to March 31, 1949.
CONCLUSIONS
—  It is not likely that the concept o f coastal state jurisdiction over the 
natural resources o f the continental shelf could be said to have been 
customary at international law before March 31, 1949.
—  If such jurisdiction is found to have been customary by that time, it is 
likely that Newfoundland, based on its pre-1934 Dominion status, had 
sufficient external sovereignty to succeed to such jurisdiction.
—  Given the federalist predilection o f the Supreme C ourt o f Canada in the 
B.C. Reference and o f federal courts in Australia and the United States in 
similar matters, it is unlikely that anything but a watertight provincial 
case would succeed.
What has become clear in the foregoing discussion is that the legal 
issues in an adjudication would be abstract and extremely technical. It is
'2*B.C. Offshore Minerals Reference, supra, footnote 43 , at 817  (S .C .R .). 3 2 6  (D .L .R .). T h e  relevant 
provision in the B.C . situation is s. 109 o f  the B.N.A. Act 1867:
101. All lands, mines, m inerals and royalties belonging to the several Provinces o f  Canada. Nova 
Scotia, and New Brunswick at the U nion, and all sums then due o r  payable for such lands, 
m ines, m inerals, o r royalties, shall belong to the several Provinces o f  O ntario, Q uebec, Nova 
Scotia, and New Brunswick in which the same are situate o r arise, subject to any trusts existing 
in respect thereof, and to any interest o th er than that o f  the Province in the same.
T h is  provision applies to British Colum bia by virtue o f  T erm  10 o f  the Terms o f  Union o f  British 
Colum bia which says that the provisions o f  the B.N.A. Act 1867 shall apply to B .C . unless otherwise 
stated. See Order in Council Admitting British Columbia Into the Union, May 16, 1871 in R .S.C . 1970, App.
II , No. 10.
I,#ln  Attorney General fo r  Canada v. Attorneys General fo r  the Provinces o f  Ontario, Quebec, and Nova Scotia, 
[1898] A.C. 700 , the Privy Council took a very strong position against transfer o f  proprietary interests 
by im plication. “T h e re  is no presum ption that because legislative jurisdiction was vested in the 
Dom inion Parliam ent proprietary rights were transferred to it. T h e  D om inion o f  C anada was called into 
existence by the British North America Act, 1867. W hatever proprietary rights were at the time o f  the 
passing o f  that Act possessed by the provinces rem ain vested in them  excep t such as are by any o f  its 
express enactm ents transferred to the Dom inion o f  C anada." per Lord H erschell at 709-10 . W hile the 
interest in the m inerals o f  the continental sh elf may not strictly qualify as proprietary, the analogy 
between proprietary rights and "sovereign rights" is a m ost com pelling one.
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doubtful whether such considerations are worthy o f prevailing in 
deciding a matter o f such consequence for the future o f our country. 
T h e  real considerations are political, not legal; the only satisfactory 
solution will be achieved by accommodation, not adjudication. Our 
political leaders might be well advised to take counsel from Lord 
Denning M.R. who, quoting Shakespeare, cautioned: . . we must take 
the current when it serves or lose our ventures.”131
'*'Trendtex Trading Corporation Ltd. v. Central Bank o f Nigeria, [1977] I All E .R . 881 , at 891 . (C .A .) per 
Lord D enning M .R ., quoting from  Shakespeare ,Julius Caesar, IV , iii, 222 .
